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The internet and communication industry continue to develop new technologies rapidly, which has 
caused a boom in smart and networking device manufacturing. With new trends, operators are 
constantly battling towards deploying multiple systems to cater for the need of all users. The higher 
bandwidth utilization and flexibility demanded new networking solutions which paved way for 
Software Defined Network (SDN). SDN is centralized platform which works with other technologies 
such as Network Function Virtualization (NFV) to offer reliable, flexible and centrally controllable 
network solutions. It offers remote access control with logical design of the system, security and 
resource management. 
 
Traditional and new developing networks despite their advantages present numerous security 
challenges. With growing users worldwide, bandwidth related security risks such as Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDOS) are of grave concern. This encourages towards reliable and rapid response 
solutions such as Cognitive Algorithms (CA) which can adapt to a threat in real time environment. 
This dissertation proposes the use of CA to deploy security and mitigation measures against potential 
DDOS flooding attack to avoid network failure and memory depletion in SDN.  
 
The experiment done in proof of concept (PoC) provided proof of greater network resource utilization 
by limiting the attack while mitigation policies are implemented. It also shows that CA can adapt to 
growing and evolving network attack strength to counter as much as possible without the intervention 
of the operator. The work for future solutions based on CA and Artificial Intelligence (AI) for security 
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Internet is constantly evolving to accommodate the ever-growing paradigm of technology 
accompanying hardware improvements such as smart phones, efficient networking devices and 
enhanced software. Rapid increase in web-based applications is observed across all internet forums 
from social media to banking and financial sectors. Applications like Facebook, Twitter, Paypal 
which form a fraction of these platforms, all rely on security of services. Privacy and data 
management is of paramount importance towards functionality of these technology giants. 
Constant increase in traffic generation, demands equally comprehensive and scalable security 
systems against adapting threats. Operators are thus faced with a constant battle for keeping up 
with the ever-changing security measures. One of the major problems is deploying security 
services in a proprietary market. Operators use vendor specific devices which have proprietary 
features. This presents problems in terms of finance, hardware and other related constraints. 
Moreover, for each new enhancement, a new node (device) must be established and extra labor to 
maintain it. Increasing device management and manpower becomes cumbersome for the biggest 
of operators. This problem has given way to the development of an effective and very versatile 
solution. 
 
Research and development (RnD) ventures across multiple vendors, operators and academia have 
paved way for a generalized solution. Software Defined Network (SDN) is the answer to provide 
a centralized local solution for real time security updates, remotely. SDN enables the 
administrators to configure network resources very quickly and adjust network-wide traffic flow 
to meet changing needs dynamically [2].  Alongside SDN, Network Function Virtualization (NFV) 
was developed as well. Even though both are cloud based computational solution, they are two 
different application with different goals.  
 
SDN implements a network control plane that has a global view of the network and decision 
making capabilities in a logical centralized and fully-programmable software platform, by 
decoupling it from the network forwarding devices [1]. SDN allows a centralized controller that 
oversees all the other devices working in that network. Programmability of the network devices 
through a remotely controlled system grants the network flexibility and dynamic solution 
implementation, in terms of network and security solutions. For instance, network control solutions 
can now be implemented between two servers oceans apart, through SDN. This also reduces the 
added cost of devices, professional expertise and other financial and time expenses associated with 
the manual deployment of the system. SDN deployment also enables scalable solutions to be 
implemented according to the need of the user and operator. SDN is a network control entity that 
provides software solutions to be implemented remotely. As the benefits of network visibility and 
network device programmability are discussed, the question could be asked as to who exactly will 
benefit. Will it be the network operator or will it, in fact, be the network intruder? [4] 
 
Security solutions implemented in a network must counter different types of threats. One of the 
primary types of threats that internet has always faced is Denial of Service (DOS) attack. DOS and 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) are some of the oldest, crude yet effective types of attacks. 
DDoS attacks can occur when multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth to a targeted 
system with spoofed source IP addresses and its purpose is to make the network and application 
resources unavailable to the genuine users for a certain period of time [5]. The attack prohibits 
legitimate users and tenants the access to the online service and requires very little technical 
expertise for execution. One of many proposed solutions is a high level programable output 
(HLPO) to filter such attacks. Research cited in [4] suggests the use of strong programming 
language to prevent DDOS, through Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention 
Systems (IPS) by harvesting from existing systems. Traditional network compatibility with SDN 
solution allows for importation of logic and security policies. Following a recent trend, traditional 
network security appliances are migrating towards programmability concepts, and Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) enables an easier network and service management, resulting an 
interesting means to enforce security policies [3]. HLPO integrated with SDN service platform 
provides Platform-as-a-service solution (PaaS) towards an SDN network. Current state of 
technology demands security solutions to be adaptive and flexible to counter evolving DOS & 
DDOS attacks. This gap was filled by incorporating Cognitive Algorithm (CA) deployment via 
HLPO to constantly update the filtration and security measures.  
 
CA is a self-adapting algorithm by taking output as a source of input for constant betterment of 
system solution. Cognitive algorithms can be of various kinds (e.g. inductive, deductive, 
incremental, non-incremental), they can perform learning with or without a teacher, with attention 
to solve cognitive tasks of various kinds [6]. CA formulates the basis of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
where multiple nodes (sources) provide the output for constant evaluation and system development 
towards a more refined and efficient output. CA and AI are used primarily to enhance system 
efficiency and to develop more economically feasible industrial, and academic methods. However, 
recently their relevance towards cyber defense have been highlighted many times. SDN can be 
integrated with CA to detect, isolate and block a DOS or DDOS attack, as proposed in this thesis. 
The work in [6] discusses multiple uses such as data mining and pattern evaluation which is the 
key for developing CA in this thesis. HLPO is implemented remotely to provide ease of execution 
to the operator while maintaining authority over customizable solutions through SDN. This thesis 
suggests security in an SDN environment through CA, implemented via HLPO to counter DOS 
and DDOS. Simulation, graphical output and statistical data analysis using Mininet, Wireshark 
and OpenDayLight (ODL) [7] respectively, provides a comprehensive insight into security 
measure against DOS attack.  
 
 
1.1.1. Problem Statement 
In the above discussed PaaS, complete network control resides with SDN Controller. All the 
updates to network devices are pushed through the SDN controller. The network, more than often 
consists of multiple subnetworks, with variation of tenants. Tenants depending upon the nature of 
their network utilization, generate different amounts of traffic. Large industrial firms, corporate 
organizations and home-based users could all reside in the same network. OpenFlow Switch is a 
virtualized (software governed) switch in Cloud based and SDN platform. It utilizes openflow 
protocols to communicate with controller to receive and transmit data. The OpenFlow switch faces 
two main challenges which are: i) limited number of entrees that flow buffer supports and ii) 
limited number of flow tables [10]. Operators have to cater for the need of variation of tenants, 
with room for increase in tenants in a SDN network. Traffic analysis for such networks becomes 
extremely difficult for operators, and filtration, more so. With growing traffic analysis of every 
data packet demands higher resources which makes the overall system costly. Distinguishing large 
legitimate traffic in a cluster of users becomes tedious and requires more investment and 
professionals like network analysts.  
 
The algorithm itself is a centralized tool for performing traffic analysis calculation (TAC) against 
DOS attack, across a spectrum of users. Research in [5] suggested IPS integrated with SDN & 
firewall by dropping packets, resting connection and logging information. So, for the entire session 
that IP is leased to a user, the SDN Routing Table (RT) can be constantly updated to report, prevent 
and isolate a flooding attack. Network programmability via SDN also ensures timely constant 
update of the CA for growing traffic demand of a user.  
 
Service providers also have to facilitate precise Network Access Control (NAC) solutions. 
Majority of DOS attacks are used as tools for probing networks for vulnerabilities, weak points 
and data acquisition. In general, the DOS attacks are usually combined with other attacks like 
MAC/IP spoofing [8]. Furthermore, DOS or any flooding attack is usually initiated using session 
establishment methods. In Open System Interconnection (OSI), sessions are established at multiple 
layers using Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Packet Internet Groper (PING), 3-Way 
Handshake using Transmission Control Protocol Synchronization (TCP-SYN) bit and more. 
Research in [5] is directed towards defense against ICMP & SYN flood attacks. Majority of 
scanning tools employed by hackers use these methods scanning and spoofing of a network. This 
presents operators with a serious challenge of securing NAC with a preemptive method against 
DOS, as all the session establishment tools are used for legitimate traffic transfer as well. For 
instance [9] points out that Domain Name Service (DNS) based DDoS amplification attacks cannot 
be stopped easily by traditional signature based detection mechanisms because the attack packets 
contain authentic data, and signature based detection systems look for specific attack-byte patterns. 
Separating an ICMP-DOS attack from an authentic ICMP connection request becomes more 
complicated.  
 
The dynamic nature of CA allows the traffic to be monitored on the go while implementing the 
security solution. HLPO through CA presents a solution by analyzing the number of session 
requests over a fixed timeframe. CA under the umbrella of SDN, allows operators to provide 
scalability to SDN network and its tenants for managing larger session request traffic (SRT). 
Filtration of SRT, grants higher legal NAC by blocking DOS/DDOS, without compromising the 
authentic traffic flow. Research in [9] utilizes Lyapunov exponent to measure the complexity of a 
flow of packets, and classifies the traffic as either normal or anomalous, based on the magnitude 
of the computed exponent. 
 
It is a well established fact that 70% and above of threats to an organization’s network and 
network-based infrastructure originate from inside [11]. Tenants hosted in the same network may 
also be hackers. An in house malicious source has always been a threat to majority of the operators 
and presents a unique challenge. Most security solutions are designed towards filtration of 
incoming packets into a network. Also, the risk of data breach from within the network is far graver 
as compared to a foreign source. Pre-authenticated user inside the network makes flooding, 
spoofing and other such attacks easier and more powerful. A number of coordinated and infected 
PCs can launch DOS or DDOS attacks [11]. Operator has to isolate each individual’s data from 
one another as well.  
A centralized controller grants administrator access to monitor all traffic within a network. South 
bound and North bound Traffic represented by SBT and NBT respectively is the data flow inwards 
and outwards of switch. The purpose is to distinguish internal and external data overflow, the type 
mimicked in a DDOS attack. NAC will be performed for north bound traffic (NBT a.k.a outgoing) 
to prevent and isolate a SDN network tenant, from becoming a DOS source. This ensures NAC of 
administrator while preventing an attack from generating from within the network. 
 
1.2. Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a security measure against DDOS attack in a SDN controller 
using CA deployment. This method introduces CA through HLPO to ensure operator-user specific 
solution to cater for both party needs. It does so by identifying illegal growing traffic as a flooding 
attack, securing the network by isolating the IP address and then blocking the malicious source 
from network tenants. The solution also suggests adaptability in security measures for flexibility 
towards ever changing traffic demand of the tenants. It not only acts as filter for south bound traffic 
(SBT a.k.a incoming) traffic but for NBT to prevent a network from becoming a DOS source. This 
could be made possible by following objectives: 
 
• To evaluate various challenges associated with DOS and DDOS attack in SDN network 
and existing related solutions. 
• To propose and design a CA using HLPO to regulate traffic in the SDN data plane and 
flow of legitimate traffic in and out of the network. 
• To design and calculate the SRT ranges for maximum threshold, malicious source isolation 
and maximum efficiency.  
• By making algorithm unbiased and flexible towards multiple tenant traffic capacity while 
keeping the traffic transparent to the administrator. 






The proposed architecture is for SDN based networks that are prone to high level DOS or DDOS 
attack. This configuration allows operators to closely monitor traffic while providing real time 
updates without the involvement of a middle party. The SDN platform overcomes proprietary only 
solution implementation, making the network more agile, robust, and remotely programmable. 
This is particularly well for operators with IOT (Internet of Things) devices, which generate large 
amount of traffic and requires round the clock NAC and DOS security. Individual CA flexibility 
for each tenant also proposes localized security zones within the network to maximize network 
efficiency for each host. It gives room for NBT-IP monitoring for tracking and isolation purposes, 
which can provide supporting information for countermeasures towards an attacking source. All 
of this attributes to an improved memory capacity, which is a primary target for any flooding attack 
(memory depletion). Cache memory containing routing, IP and network information in particular, 
is susceptible to this attack. This could translate into better and faster system management with 
increased output. The security solution highlights the following in particular: 
 
• To confine access to legitimate traffic only and block the rest of the data packets (in SBT). 
• To prevent flooding attack by identification, isolation and blockade of malicious IP source. 
• To improve NAC by filtration of SRT. 
• To prevent in-house deployment of a DOS source in the network.  
• And to improve the scalability of the algorithm to adapt towards security changes. 
 
1.4. Dissertation Outline 
 
A brief yet precise insight into SDN controller and network function scalability has been made in 
this chapter. It further elaborated security problems associated with the DOS and DDOS attacks. 
Short introduction towards the existing scope of solution was made, along with aims & objectives.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses in depth the details of SDN technology architecture and CA. Use of CA in 
SDN for security mitigation as well resource management of memory through Dynamic Memory 
Allocation (DMA) is reviewed. The proposed security solution of CA and SDN based security is 
reviewed for existing literature and proposed methodology. This chapter will also define the 
DDOS in general and its classifications. A statistical analysis of recorded flooding attacks and 
prevention measures proposed in RnD will be discussed. IOT devices and their association with 
flooding attacks would be briefly elaborated for better understanding. And it would be concluded 
on the proposed method of solution, as a results of literature review and its comparison with 
existing methods protocols. 
 
Chapter 3 hosts the framework that is proposed and strengthened by literature review, for SDN 
Controller implementation of CA deployment. Focus of this chapter will be towards SDN 
controller environment while comparing CA and existing security protocols. Markov’s Chain rule, 
which constitutes the basics for development of CA will be discussed thoroughly and proposed 
CA will be brought forward. Finally, the chapter will be concluded leaving room for future 
possibilities of SDN and CA integration platforms. 
 
Chapter 4 is the proof of concept (PoC) and its implementation for CA in SDN environment. This 
chapter entails software and tools necessary for the design, simulation and output analysis of the 
proposed solution. Major components linked with PoC are Mininet, POX SDN Controller, 
Wireshark and OpenDayLight (ODL) [7]. Few other tools for result enhancement will also be 
mentioned here. Architectural design of the network in ODL will also be demonstrated. The 
software associated with HLPO and its constructed code tests are performed to demonstrate its 
purpose. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the results obtained by implementing PoC in previous chapter to analyze 
security output efficiency. The results will be verified through a method of tri-verification (TVF), 
where SDN CA will be supported by comparing and analyzing with two independent sources, 
executed on different software platforms. More so, calculations are presented as graphical output 
for DOS strength across the network, efficiency spectrum of the algorithm and percentage 
evaluation gain and loss of the system.  
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the thesis by defining the findings and their possible advantages in 
research and industrial community. The future prospects of CA as security tool is discussed in 
detail, with integration towards remote network deployment via SDN. 
 
1.5. Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 1 provides introduction for the technologies and methodologies used for the thesis. It 
discusses developing challenges in a SDN network environment directly relating to DOS and 
DDOS attacks. Aims and objectives specifically define methodologies involved in providing 
solutions for those issues. Scope covers the security measures in step by step explanation and tasks 
associated; and section 1.4 sheds a brief light on the various topics associated with upcoming 




























This chapter presents in detail the work done on Software Defined Network (SDN) and Cognitive 
Algorithm, and studies how the two can be integrated to provide protection against Denial of 
Service (DOS) attacks. Previous security solutions in SDN architecture are examined for strengths 
and weaknesses to provide Platform as a Service (PaaS) solutions. Existing research opting 
wavelet analysis and other non-algorithm-based solutions for DOS protection are brought forward. 
All of the reviews, including general SDN security as well as the algorithm mitigation are 
analyzed, and are used to formulate self-adapting, Cognitive Algorithm (CA). From this, the 
algorithm is extended to a SDN deployment to establish an Anti-DDOS platform by enabling 
remote updates and security changes. Brief introduction into DDOS and its targeted application 
platforms is supported with statistical attack history. This is to signify the importance of security 
solution implementation and existing research. Therefore, security solution is cognitive algorithm 
implemented in SDN application platform. 
 
2.2. Software Defined Network (SDN) 
 
  2.2.1. Software Defined Network Architecture 
 
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) allows for fast reactions to security threats by dynamically 
enforcing simple forwarding rules as counter-measures [3]. SDN decouples the control and data 
planes, wherein a logically centralized controller performs forwarding decisions on behalf of 
switches [12]. Centralized controller allows for network alterations through software or platforms 
to provide Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS) respectively. Services 
through SDN are offered through three different planes which are: application, control and data 
(Infrastructure) planes as shown in figure 2.1. 
 
The application layer comprises of software-based network applications that manage data and 
provide logic to the controller. Updates, logical control and security solutions are enforced through 
software or network program at the application layer to relay decision to data planes. The data 
plane consists of network elements, each element contains a series of network resources and 
business processes, SDN resources are based on the underlying physical entity and capabilities 
supported and given [13]. Application Program Interfaces (APIs) use protocols enforced by users 
to deliver best flow routes and constantly update Flow Tables (FT). The control layer is the core 
of an SDN, which consists of controllers that take responsibility of managing traffic flow in a 
network, flow forwarding and taking decision on routing using programming [10]. The 
programming usually is a HLPO which is formulated and maintained in a software at application 
layer, to be executed at control or data plane layer. This is discussed in detail in chapter 3 and 4. 
Researchers can write their protocols freely on the control layer, so that the network can be creative 
and implement the protocol of API OpenFlow, which is a powerful promoter of this idea [13]. 
SDN protocols provide more flexibility to the administrator as compared to a conventional routing 




Figure 2.1 [28] SDN Architecture  
 
Some of the common examples of such APIs are: 
• Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a protocol used for exchanging routing information 
between gateway hosts in a network of autonomous systems [15]. 
• The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) is an Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) network management protocol. It provides an administrator or network engineer 
with a secure way to configure a firewall, switch, router, or other network device [15]. 
• Open vSwitch DataBase Management Protocol (OVSDB) to configure Open vSwitch. 
 
This integration has proven more efficient in optimizing network solutions, traffic monitoring and 
customized security algorithms for Intrusion Preventions Systems (IPS). Software security 
platforms integrated with network devices such as switches, have provided more robust security 
options. Work in paper [17] presents one example of building a firewall over SDN, using the POX 
controller and Python Programming Language. The collaboration of a SDN Controller with 
programming languages for implementing IDS and IPS, opens room for advancements in  security 
enforcement. Different software and programming security solutions can be modified for SDN 
requirements, removing compatibility and proprietary complications, in standard routing network 
[14]. Advanced and more complex security algorithms are being employed using software and 
networking tools at SDN application layer.  
 
2.2.2. SDN Security Solutions 
 
Security solutions using SDN have been used to counter multiple arrays of attacks from DDOS, 
Man in the Middle (MiM), IP Spoofing and more. This research is focused towards mitigation and 
security methodologies deployed towards flooding, and DDOS attacks. Work done by researchers 
in [3] proposes a novel approach of stateful monitoring by StateSec. It works by matching 
configurable traffic features (e.g., IP src/dst, port src/dst) without resorting to the controller and 
the solution is implemented at Open vSwitch (OVS). OVS is a SDN solution for on the go network 
deployment that is discussed in detail in 4.2.2 and chapter 3. It employs an entropy-based algorithm 
to detect variety of attacks such as DDOS and Port Scan. The solution suggested in this work uses 
entropy to detect abnormalities in data patterns and executes pre-installed reactive 
countermeasures. Computational delegation from controller to network devices such as switches 
is critical. This is suggested to relieve computational power at controller to carry higher operations. 
 
Intrusion Preventions System (IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are presented in [5] 
which perform filtration of the network packets. It uses Software Defined Cloud (SDC) to provide 
network traffic filtration by using IDS and IPS at a SDC firewall. Dynamically distributed firewalls 
combined with IPS and IDS, provide a secure NAC as demonstrated by conducting an ICMP 
DDOS attack of 10,000 packets per second. Research in [3,5] suggests functionality outsourcing 
from controller to switch which provides stronger SDN.  
 
Rajat and Markku in [12] present a DDOS mitigation technique using SDN by configuring an 
optimal idle timeout value and flow aggregation. This work performs an immediate flow memory 
dump in event of a DDOS attack and the intelligent analysis of how state rules prevent overflow 
of a Flow table memory. Similar work in [17] suggests a simple and effective enforcement of a 
“Rate Limiter” to control packets being sent to controller. The rate limiter is implemented using 
sFlow which notifies mitigation software at SDN application layer for solution. It suggests how 
the use of SDN in an OVS offers flexibility, reliability and operational strength. 
  
Recently, the SGuard solution has been popular amongst SDN security schemes. As described in 
[8], a security application on top of the NOX controller that mainly contains two modules: The 
access control module and the classification module. In support of the work in [3, 5], controller 
saturation alleviation is a key factor mentioned in this research. Lightweight controllers are better 
utilized for optimizing NAC, DDOS mitigation and security procedures in an affordable system. 
Source tracing is achieved through access control by logging information, in order to remap 
abnormal packets to their source. The solution provides a light and cheap answer to DDOS 








2.3. Dynamic Memory Limiter 
 
2.3.1. Dynamic Memory Allocation 
 
 
Flooding attacks are particularly dependent on the nature of intent of an attacker. The goal is to 
deny the user of access or to conceal the malicious packets for a graver purpose such as MAC or 
IP Spoofing. Regardless of the approach, cache memory (routing tables/flow tables) used for 
storing forwarding protocols is the main target.    
Switches and networking devices have limited memory. For example, the HP 560zl OVS can store 
only 1500 flow rules before flooding completely [12]. The concept of a dynamic memory limiter 
is to impose a changing memory state, to accommodate data within a defined threshold. The 
dynamic nature is due to variations in DDOS attacks as most of them are hard to detect because 
either they appear very suddenly or slowly and consistently making greater complications [3]. 
Virtualization and remote access to the network has allowed for better resource management of 
the network. An efficient memory system has been discussed in [18] operating on a global 
allocation technique along with memory releasing and memory growing for satisfying the memory 
demand during run time. This proposed model is for a cloud virtualization platform and delivers 
result by information collection, monitoring, statistical analysis and optimal memory allocation. 
Cloud environments are supported by Openstack and  Devstack support platforms that deploy the 
system in a Virtual Tenant Network (VTN). Calculations in [18] are promising and delivered 
through designing a Memory Release Algorithm (MRA). Resource management and memory 
allocation are vital in a SDN prone to DDOS. Flow table memory control decreases the risk of 
sudden resource depletion and acts as an early warning for mitigation actions to comply 
accordingly. Software memory allocation in real life applications such as VLC-Player, My SQL 
and few more is demonstrated in [19]. Time limitation is a factor towards memory allocation which 
is briefly discussed in this paper. Many virtualization systems have a scaling function with which 
memory allocation size for a virtual machine can be dynamically changed without restarting the 
virtual machine [20]. Cache Hit Ratio is buffer size management in virtual machine which is used 
in [20] to demonstrate strong results towards memory management in network virtualization as 














Figure 2.2 [20] Memory performance with limit on ER Violation 
Memory management is constructed using an algorithm to accommodate varying memory needs. 
Suggested algorithms in [18] are amongst the many designed for network efficiency and are 
customized to changing topology and requirements. A network administrator can define the 
parameters for a developing SDN, improving its scalability and performance for up to date security 
measures for Flow table management against flooding attacks.  
 
 
2.3.2. Dynamic Memory Limiter Defense 
 
Dynamic memory limiter methods have been proposed to keep uniform memory allocation per 
host or device to avoid centralized flooding of a network. This is achieved by varying memory 
assignment per user within the confined limits of the networking system. Timing channel attacks, 
often used by flooding attacks to gain NAC, have been discussed in [20]. Secure dynamic memory 
allocation through a secure memory controller (SecMC) is suggested in this paper. It brilliantly 
utilizes Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) to provide a dynamic storage solution based 
on an error violation algorithm. The algorithm processes every request (ER) for violation of 
memory allocation. ER is a heavyweight solution but effective in response to growing data 
allocation towards specific memory set. However, this algorithm sets a tradeoff where security is 
compromised for performance and the system is susceptible to information leakage. Processing 
ER causes memory overload during high traffic and creates security gaps during packet drop for 
malware and network probing. 
  
Flow tables and memory units in networking devices work parallel with IPS, IDS and such 
firewalls to maintain system operation even when under attack. In paper [21], critical amount 
guaranteed memory allocation (CAGMA) in virtual machines (VMs) is suggested for this purpose. 
The maximum memory assigned to a VM is calculated using formula shown in (1) below: 
 
 
CMA (𝑣𝑚𝑖) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜏𝑖 ,𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝑖{𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑈(𝜏𝑖 ,𝑗)}     (1) 
Critical Amount Memory Allocation [21] 
 
 
The rationale behinds our proposed CAGMA is to guarantee the available memory of each VM 
never less than a critical memory amount (CMA), denoted as CMA(vmi), for each vmi ∈ VM. VM 
is each virtual machine and “I” is the count or number of machines. The allocated memory amount 
and the available memory amount of a vmi are defined byALM(vmi) and AVM(vmi), respectively. 
The memory utilization of a vmi is defined by MU(vmi) which can be calculated by MU(vmi)= 
ALM(vmi)−AVM(vmi). We also consider a set ALM(vmi) of tasks Ti = {τi,1,τi,2, ··· ,τi,mi} 
which being executed in vmi. The memory usage of a task τi,j (i.e., the required memory amount 
of τi,j) is defined by MemU(τi,j). 
Work of [21] promotes the idea of critical memory utilization and limitation for a network attack. 
The algorithm and CAGMA designed here is for memory efficiency and resource management. 
However, a security algorithm integrated towards the existing set up shown in (1) could provide a 
limiter for DOS prevention and securing the network. This provides a fruitful result towards an 
affordable, reliable and redundant system for industrial security functions. 
2.4. Cognitive Algorithm 
 
2.4.1. Design and Development 
 
As described in [6] and the previous chapter, Cognitive Algorithm (CA) is a design and 
implementation, of self-assessing and modifying solution towards output efficiency. Elegant 
design of CA demands complex solutions to be handled in real time with improved answer for the 
future. This means that solution has to be advance enough to surpass average algorithm 
computation while draining minimum processing resources. Object classification literature shows 
that conventional algorithms are evolving towards cognitive informatics and cognitive computing 
machines [12]. Work in [25] points towards the development of cognitive decision algorithms for 
predictability models for lottery and numerous financial sector outputs. Priority Heuristic (PH) is 
utilized for analyzing future statistical prediction using past data analysis. Mathematical models 
for performing straightforward decisions are evolving towards pattern recognition, forecast 
modeling and complex solutions.  
 
Machova and Paralic in their work in [6] conclude the use of CAs towards basic fundamentals, to 
either improve quality of system of knowledge or to yield knowledge of a system to gain profit or 
competitive edge. The quality of the learning algorithm design depends on the suitable selection 
of one or more basic principles [6]. Each algorithm design must be altered based on the 
functionality requirements and variable constraints of the system.  
 
This thesis suggests utilization of Markov’s Chain Rule for the development of a CA for ICMP-
DDOS count check. The mathematical model for system design analysis of DDOS will be 
formulated based on Markov’s Chain Rule analysis which will be discussed in next chapter. In 
security, Chaos Theory suggested in work of [9], [22], [23] and [24] is a very fundamental and 
prudent methodology towards DDOS mitigation. Exponential variable algorithms such as 
“Lyapunov Exponent” are developed incorporating operator-user needs based SDN security. The 
outcome of exponential, or other such algorithms designs, is to support entropy or anomaly 
detection solutions to detect flooding attack abnormalities in a SDN. Scalable and self-assessing 
solutions offer reliable and affordable performance as demonstrated by these papers and provide 
less computational power with reduced manpower for the system. Flooding attack mitigation by 
using CAs is discussed in next topic. 
 
2.4.2. CAs past solutions against DDOS 
 
Basic security measures formulated on simple algorithm designs are now inadequate. Thus, due to 
the mutating nature of cyber security threats, the intrusion detection database of signatures and 
anomalous behavior patterns of cyber threats needs to be autonomously and adaptively updated in 
a manner that requires intelligence beyond that provided by conventional algorithms [9]. CAs do 
so by dynamically changing the outcome to meet adaptive network requirements against varying 
attack strengths.  
Chaos theory is a popular idea used for anomalous behavior recognition using entropy-based tools. 
As explained in [9], Chaos theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with the study of the 
stability of dynamic systems and is distinguished from nonlinear stochastic processes where 
variables are random in nature. Research methods in [9] use Lyapunov Exponent to calculate 
anomalous network traffic which provided result of 66% detection. Lyapunov exponent 
fundamentals are shown below in (2) and (3). 
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=  𝐽𝑖 ,𝑗  (𝑥(0))              (3) 
 
Lyapunov Exponent [9] 
 
 
(2) represents nonlinear dynamic system of Lyapunov exponent where (3) is matrix form of the 
equation. ⋋ represents the divergence of the of the signature-based detection of the system. It 
evaluates and determine an attack based on time variation of data packets represented by ∆ 𝑥 (𝑡). 
⋋ represents limit solution where packets are assessed on attack patterns. Entire spectrum of 
exponents cannot be evaluated [12] which leaves room for MiM and Eavesdropping threats. 
Despite the high detection output the algorithm designed in this paper for DNS flooding attacks 
required a lot of memory as attack files had to be broken down and analyzed per packet. Set-ups 
such as this require off line data processing units working in support of online devices and makes 
real time DDOS filtration cumbersome for system.  
 
Network Anomaly Prediction Algorithm (NAPA) solution presented in [22] proposes divergence-
based anomaly detection based on Chaos Theory. The anomaly is based on the Lemda (⋋) variable 
which represents orbital divergence from the stable traffic. Under Chaos theory umbrella, [23] 
proposes “Time Range Analysis” using “Network Anomaly Detection Algorithm” (NADA) for 
mitigating DDOS attacks. This paper has utilized autoregressive model – time series analysis for 
cumulating averaging traffic variation. Both papers are supported by anomaly detection using 
variance algorithms. However, the anomalous detection in [22, 23] is less than 66% and is not 
designed for instantaneous traffic processing. System analysis with real time traffic would generate 
lag due to processing needs and would require expensive set-ups to keep with growing flooding 
traffic. Lag in sudden growing DDOS traffic in a network attack is inevitable, even for most 
advance systems. Therefore, this thesis recommends dynamic memory expansion of the system, 
allowing IPS and IDS to perform calculations while maintaining operation across network. 
 
An entropy solution in [24] is customized using Lyapunov exponent to detect DDOS attack. 
Exponent detection algorithm and its separation is performed using equation (6), where (4) and (5) 
represent entropy limits which calculate the variation in traffic. It calculates source and destination 
IP entropy in time to predict traffic anomaly.  
 
 





                 (4)               
𝐻𝑞
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  
1− 𝑁1−𝑞
𝑞−1 
               (5) 
 
General and Maximum Entropy Calculation [24] 
 
 






             (6) 
 
Trajectory Calculations via Exponent Separation [24] 
 
 
𝐻𝑠 for source IPs, and 𝐻𝑑 for destination IPs. In order to generate dynamical equations, we herein 
use AR model to pre-process these sequences. And lastly t is notation for time. 𝐻𝑞 is a Tsallis 
entropy where q is entropic parameter [24]. It detects traffic anomaly by dividing the probability 
factor 𝑝𝑖
𝑞
 by total packets N, providing the threshold limits of the entropy-based system. The 
solution in [24] is lightweight solution which is very basic towards detection of DDOS. Far more 
advance detection methods exist with greater computational output and efficiency. Solutions 
suggested in [22, 23] and [24] allow anomaly detection by traffic analysis. These solutions are not 
flexible in SDN or any networking environment where hosts in subnetworks are evolving. 
Changing traffic volume generating legitimate traffic could be flagged as a potential anomaly. This 
thesis suggests adaptive algorithm towards ICMP flood, in an SDN environment where traffic 
changes and algorithms adapt, compensating legitimate session requests towards a host.  
 
2.5. CA based solution for SDN 
 
2.5.1. SDN Security Architecture and Challenges 
 
The main features supported by cloud networks and SDN are on-demand self-service, broad 
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service [5]. SDN control and data 
plane separation is the biggest leap towards the security enforcement as mentioned in section 2.2.  
Currently most research work focuses on exploiting SDN to improve network security by using 
monitoring systems by inserting security policies to dynamically detect and mitigate suspicious 
traffic during live network operations [2]. The major approach towards securing a network is by 
performing security mitigations at the switch, governed by the controller. Work done in [2], [4], 
[26] and [27] stress on security checks and balances to be performed through switch under the 
centralized controller network. This alleviates controller to perform higher functions and prevents 
it from a potential bottleneck by flowing raw data through it. Instead the raw data is fed to switch 
for filtration through already provided flow controls via controller, and only flagged data (as error) 
is sent for higher processing such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).  
 
The security architecture in [2] defines the threats towards SDN platform, which are common to 
traditional networking but their profile and level changes with SDN architecture. The threat level 
for certain spoofing and eavesdropping attacks increases due to the remote nature of SDN. For 
example, the controller is under the constant threat of being hijacked, to redefine the entire network 
to hacker’s will, initiating stealth attacks such as eavesdropping. Work in this paper recommends 
packet data scan detection (PDSD) to locate worm and Trojan like threats. It solves the issue for 
secure communication link between the data plane and the controller using southbound API. 
However, PDSD is a cumbersome process with the tradeoff between time and higher processing. 
System cost and higher processing requirements make this an expensive set up for commercial 
use. 
 
A systematic approach using SDN specific features (programmability, dynamic flow etc.) can 
yield higher security mitigation against threats as mentioned in [26]. It provides a holistic 
hierarchal approach where a switch acting as an actuator senses and provides information 
performing the grunt work for controller, which in turn assesses the threats and responds with 
security mitigation. From the detection of a threat towards the mitigation act generated by the 
controller, a time lag is often observed which can eventually overwhelm the system. This 
particularly is a problem towards high volume flooding attacks. However, algorithms designed 
towards countering DDOS have been hinted in [26] and their importance is highlighted. 
Researchers in [27] proposed an event-based security measure using “Bro” for security 




Figure 2.3 Bro Security System [27] 
 
 
An application or control defined network based on algorithm design is implemented through 
“Bro” to make controller as light as possible. As indicated by figure 2.6, this is made possible by 
performing security checks for data packets at data plane on open vSwitch. Thus, the overall 
central processing unit (CPU) saw a significant drop in its workload, making it available to tackle 
large volume attacks like DDOS.  
 
Outsourcing security procedures to data plane devices like vSwitches decreases the workload for 
a controller, making it more capable towards handling a DDOS. This thesis entails this idea and 
executes it to measure the response of this under a CA and dynamic memory allocation to minimize 
sudden network crashes caused by DDOS attacks.    
 
 
2.5.2. Benefits of Security through SDN 
 
SDN security solutions have provided promising results for security implementations for 
networks. Centralized network control allows for new features to be added. Dynamic access 
control functions can be implemented which was previously done by independent middleboxes 
(e.g., firewalls) to achieve in-line access control [26]. Work in [2], [4] and [26] highlights some of 
the basic and vital advantages of SDN over a traditional routing network. Aside from the reduced 
cost of the overall system, it offers easily applicable, reliable security architecture. Some of the 
important features are detailed below: 
 
• Dynamic Flow Control: allows for systematic and dynamic flow of control throughout the 
network as mentioned in [26]. 
 
• Centralized Control: Centralized administrative control over network performance and 
security, for various devices and hosts. 
 
• Network Programmability: Network application programmability, data plane 
reconfiguration and multiple vendor operability provides customized solution tailored for 
customer satisfaction. 
 
• Open Source Platform: Programmability integrated with open sourcing opens the door 
towards customized solution removing hinderance of proprietary device management. This 
offers a customizable, centralized solutions to be accepted universally in a single SDN 
system.  
 
• Network Security: Controlling network flows dynamically provides many new possibilities 
in network security functions [26]. Network security is increased using diverse granularity 
and better NAC is enforced by centralized monitoring of the system.  
 
• Compatibility: programmable centralized network offers greater compatibility across  a 
variety of vendors which are used according to operator’s preference. 
  
• Cost Efficient: Overall cost of the system is cheaper due to lesser “purpose specific 
networking devices [26] and reduced manpower for network checks and maintenance. 
 
Cognitive Algorithm uses programmability to execute NAC against DDOS attacks at the data 
plane or controller depending upon the performance preference of operator. This thesis suggests 
using a CA as a filter towards growing DDOS attack at network devices to minimize Flow table 
or cache memory overflow.  
 
 
2.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the basic architecture of SDN and various security solutions associated 
with it in depth. Existing security infrastructure of SDN for threat analysis and IPS are studied 
particularly towards flooding attacks. SGuard, IPS and IDS are analyzed in existing solutions for 
DDOS attacks. A dynamic memory limiter is suggested as a valuable asset for memory overflow 
limitation. In depth analysis of defense against DDOS through CAs is carried out. Chaos Theory 
has served as a remarkable tool for mitigating DDOS attacks. This theory is based on mathematical 
algorithms based on exponential variables such as Lyapunov exponent. 
Lastly, in section 2.5 we summarize how CA – based solutions through SDN are used in the past 


































Software Defined Networking (SDN) has made easy network deployment possible, with 
centralized control through a controller. However, some of the new features such as remote and 
centralized data control exposes the network to traditional network threats. Moreover, there are 
some new security challenges such as bypassing predefined mandatory policies by overwriting 
flow entries and data eavesdropping by inserting fraudulent flow entries [2]. Cognitive Algorithm 
(CA) grants better security to the data and control plane to provide reliable, scalable and robust 
security solutions. Primary security of the data plane through CA, also provides a set up for better 
data and memory resource management. This provides a single Software as a Service (SaaS) 
platform which is a multi-purpose tool for administrative and security management. Through the 
centralized controller we can easily implement a network load balancing function that is not readily 
and cheaply solved with existing techniques [26]. This thesis recommends the use of CA to 
establish a self-adjusting count check for an ICMP-DDOS attack. The proposed CA count check 
is deployed in parallel with a dynamic memory limiter to support SDN functionality in an event 
of a DDOS attack. The CA solution proposed here, needs to be expanded and executed in an SDN 
framework to demonstrate the Network Access Control (NAC).  
 
SDN offers programmability and reliance in the system where CA can be deployed for improved 
network services. SDN thrives on the concept of separated control and data plane functionality and 
programmability in the network [4]. Application and security controls can be assembled in a single 
plane to offer Software as a Service (SaaS) for the entire network. Centralized control of the 
network through a single controller aids in SaaS protocol implementation on multiple devices with 
uniformity and total compliance. The CA framework presented in this chapter illustrates how SDN 
and CA can be integrated to form a Line of Defense (LOD) for the entire network and how it can 
contribute towards memory management to counter flooding attacks. The framework discussed 
would formulate the foundation for the proposed solution of CA-SDN against an ICMP-DDOS 
attack. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is distributed as follow: Section 3.2 discusses the proposed security 
solution and the algorithm used for its deployment, particularly Markov’s Chain Rule. Section 3.3 
describes the details of data plane and how the security solution deployment at the infrastructural 
layer reduces workload and potential bottleneck at controller. A brief introduction about the SDN 
Controller is made in section 3.4 to highlight its functions. The development of security solutions 
in the application layer is discussed in section 3.5 in relation to the past solutions. Finally, the 
chapter is summarized in section 3.6.   
 
3.2. Cognitive Algorithm based SDN Framework 
 
As mentioned in previous chapter CA is self-assessing logical solution, which works for 
improvement of overall functionality of the purpose-built system. The algorithm is designed to 
manage specific functionality of the system and challenges accompanied with it. Security analysts 
and administrators can utilize its flexibility and recurrence analysis to their advantage to save 
money, time and hardware-based resources. Security equipment manufacturers have already 
started to develop and sell commercial products based on SDN concepts [3]. Instead of purpose 
built IPS and IDS devices, CA can be deployed at data plane devices through the centralized 
controller. The majority of threat mitigation is handled by CA based in data plane, which grants 
flexibility to the administrator to perform higher level security tasks. The integration of CA in 
SDN for this thesis is illustrated in figure 3.1 
 
The figure shows multiple layers of the SDN network set up much like figure 2.1 in previous 
chapter. Multiple Open Virtual Switches (OVS) can be deployed in a cluster that are connected to 
each other forming data connectivity in data plane. This allows operators to rapidly send security 
policies through north bound API to the controller, which can instantaneously deploy these policies 
at OVS. Rapid deployment of OVS also reduces the cost and hardware which in a conventional 
network would have to be physically deployed into the network. The OVS is an open flow switch 
which resides in data plane layer connected to VMs, acquiring instructions from application layer 
[29]. Communication between application-control plane and control-data plane through north and 
south bound APIs respectively, is what controls the OVS as shown in figure 3.1 
 
The proposed network security solution in this thesis is in fact a Network Function (NF) which is 
being implemented at data plane level. After being defined at application layer as a NF, the CA 
solution is executed in OVS, the functionality of which resides in application plane and is executed 
in data plane. The SDN controller in early solutions was used to handle the security enforcements 
which developed a lot of traffic towards the controller from north and south bound APIs. This 
particularly was a challenging issue for DDOS mitigation as the network could not cope with 
growing network traffic. Besides a potential flooding attack, a growing SDN with more hosts 
experienced delays between issuing of control flow protocols and implementing them. Another 
option was to delegate as much computation as possible to switches without compromising their 
performance, letting the controller being only in charge of mitigation [3]. VMs and OVS allow 
this feature to be deployed with ease, which is now quickly becoming a norm, delegating power 
to switches. This thesis deploys CA supporting this norm in order to make controller work load as 
light as possible. Dynamic memory limiter and count check based on CA can sustain a flooding 
attack at data plane while mitigation policies are enforced and updated LOD is implemented. 
Compromise of the controller is of grave concern as discussed in [3], [12] and [30] as it can isolate 
data plane from rest of the network, making security mitigations impossible to implement among 
other network functions. However, redundancy and failsafe to the system can be introduced by 
adding a backup controller, with same plane view of the network as the primary as shown in figure 
3.1. It offers better network management at the cost of more resources. The next topics discuss the 
deployment and effects of CA in each individual plane of SDN. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 SDN Plane View Architecture [31] 
 
3.2.1. Markov’s Chain Rule 
 
The general concept of cognitive and higher power algorithms is formulated on a cyclic loop 
feedback system. This thesis utilizes the Discrete-Markov’s Chain Rule to develop and deploy the 
cognitive algorithm through an SDN controller. This is a memory dependent algorithm which 
resides on the outcome of past calculations, unlike Bernoulli and Poisson equations which are 
stateless [34]. Markov’s Chain Rule solution implied for SDN-CA model in this thesis is 
represented by figure 3.2. A state of constant update and monitoring is demonstrated through the 
figure where existing flow rules are assessed; represented by “A11” and “B12”. OVS performs 
checks through flow tables to locate existing solutions in A11 and B12 which are represented by 
state of mitigation actions A12 and B11 respectively. An error or prompt update request is sent to 
the ODL Controller should “A11 and B12” are unable to locate a flow rule for the scenario at hand. 
Using OVSDB (OVS – Database Management), southbound API constantly updates the controller 
for requesting new flow rules or updating the blacklist for the entire network. The entire network 
is monitored by the administrator at the application layer which has direct access over the ODL 
controller. The controller sends updated blacklist to OVSs connected to the network and requests 
new flow rule policies from the administrator, which are represented by control actions Cnt 11 and 
Cnt12 respectively. This promotes a centralized command and access control over the SDN. The 
loopback system of Markov’s Chain provides feedback which is used in this thesis to detect sudden 
ICMP growth in network. This provides an early DDOS detection and executes mitigation 
strategies.  
 
Figure 3.2 Markov’s Chain Rule for SDN-CA Deployment 
 
 
Figure 3.2 provides a system specific view of memory state function [34] algorithm, which in this 
thesis is Markov’s Chain Rule. Equation (4) and (5) cited in [24] are an entropy-based solution, 
which are one of many ways to detect and address growing traffic in a network. The generalized 
concept behind the working of such algorithms is shown in figure 3.3 below. Figure 3.3 holds true 
for traditional network and SDN where anomaly detection using Lyapunov exponent [9], [24] 
could be achieved at the input. However, SDN allows for remote and easier deployment of such 
solutions as compared to a traditional network. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Generalized Algorithm Deployment  
 
 
3.3. Data Plane in CA-SDN Security  
 
OVSs and physical interfaces in a cluster form the data plane layer of SDN. VMs resources are 
managed at application plane by the administrator, controlled by software entities called 
Hypervisors. Open vSwitch leverages OpenFlow and the Open Virtual Switch Database (OVSDB) 
management protocols, which means it can operate both as a soft switch running within the 
hypervisor, and as the control stack for switching [29]. Memory and resource management is 
controlled through the hypervisor which resides over VM. On practical bases VM and hypervisor 
are referred to as a single logical entity which is configured by administrator for rapid network 
deployment. On demand of the user, the SDN operator leases the VM resources which are utilized 
by host for the session withinthe network. The functionality of OVS is of huge importance as it is 
the first entry point into the data plane and bifurcates the controller and network devices as shown 
in figure 3.1. The data plane supports network devices through design implementations shown in 
figure 3.4. The hypervisor hosts the OVS and VM which communicate via Virtual Interface (vIF) 
and Virtual Network Interface Controller (VNIC) as described in figure 3.4. Hypervisors, VMs 
and OVSs are integrated to form a virtual network which is connected to physical switch through 
vIF created in OVS.  
 
OVS provides a universal logical solution deployment as it is not bound by proprietary network 
device limitations, which are seen in vendor only devices such as CISCO. As mentioned before, 
this provides customizable security solutions to be implemented at data level and OVS can be 
updated at the operator’s discretion with the latest security methodologies of industry and 
academia. This thesis exploits that very concept to introduce a CA-based solution against flooding 
attacks at the OVS. The basic principle of OVS through sflow or other such protocol dictates that 
all NBT and SBT to flow through the switch. Dynamic traffic flow management at the OVS allows 
not only for control of incoming traffic but can prohibit an internal threat from one of the hosts as 
stated in [11]. Internal network security offers prevention measures in isolating a network within 
a network. This is shown through figure 3.5 where CA security measures can prevent flooding 
attacks within the network.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 OVS and pIF Setup [32] 
 
 
Multiple planes of SDN shown in figure 3.5 are secured through the following: 
 
• Each plane communicates via secure API mediums which ensure data confidentiality. 
 
• The data packets are secured through hash functions, data off sets and other measures. 
 
• Finally, access to the application, control and data plane itself is encrypted to ensure 
maximum data integrity and, intrusion detection. 
 
This provides localized security zones within a SDN, enabling layer by layer security as shown in 
figure 3.5. Dynamic memory allocation solutions such as critical amount guaranteed memory 
allocation (CAGMA) presented in [21] are fast becoming standards in network security against 
flooding attacks. The need for a system to be operational during an external threat is paramount 
whilst the operator or service provider deploys countermeasures. Most dynamic memory solutions, 
function on a mathematical-based algorithm which allots memory dynamically based on the need 
of the system. Memory resource management in SDN is controlled through the hypervisor – VM, 
which is directly controlled by the operator. The administrator can deploy CA, which allocates 
memory dynamically to an OVS, depending on the resources available. Flooding mitigation, 
dynamic memory allocation and limitation within a threshold can all be integrated into a single 
CA, developed and updated at the application layer by operator to be implemented at data plane in 
OVS. The result would be a sustainable SDN ecosystem which can withstand a potential flooding 
attack without depleting its memory resources. The logical details of the solution presented in this 
thesis will be discussed in proof of concept (PoC). 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Localized Security Zones in SDN 
3.4. Controller plane in SDN-CA deployment 
 
The control plane houses the controller which resides over data plane to oversee the functions of 
the network devices. The controller is operated by the administrator to optimize network 
functionality for providing reliable and consistent services to the host. The control plane is made 
of SDN-administrative virtual functions which govern the control flow of the network. The 
controller is a vital part of the SDN environment as it not only acts as a mediator for traffic 
communication but is often optimized for performing security functions of network. However, 
security algorithm and performance evaluation for this research are based in the data plane for 
distributed work load across network. Research papers mentioned in section 3.3 support LOD to 
be established at the data plane due to its stability, flexibility and workload-ease towards the 
controller. For improved network performance, multiple controllers can be connected for higher 
data bandwidth and reliability towards overall SDN. The overall working concept for the 
experiment is provided below. 
 
• The algorithm is generated and forwarded by control plane with “Python” programming 
language to the SDN Controller. The Opendaylight (Helium) Control plane from Open 
Software Network allows Python script to work interchangeably with L2/L3 switching 
devices.  
• Controller acts as the central core system for maintaining and updating security CA 
policies. Virtual switches running on Hypervisor resources utilize the security policies and 
memory allocated by the CA via controller. 
• DMA resides with controller based on constant update from the Virtual Switches. Memory 
increase during attack, isolation and filtration is performed when controller is updated of 
potential threat via L2/L3 devices. 
 
Due to limited processing and memory unit of switches; bandwidth limitation, feedback to SDN 
controller and DMA updates are the core responsibilities of the switches. As memory allocated by 
SDN Controller configures the data management, that process becomes automated. Hence, our 
primary concern is the Controller’s ability to quickly manage and enforce security policies. But 
our primary result for filtering DDOS packets is attained from the L2 devices as controller does 
not handle the data packets directly, due to a single bottleneck point in SDN. 
 
 
3.5. Application plane in SDN-CA deployment 
 
Mutually agreed operator-user preferences in a network are developed in the application plane for 
a SDN. It hosts security, management and monitoring applications which allow for overall 
management of the network. Work in this thesis suggests developing a CA security solution for 
DDOS mitigation and dynamic memory allocation at application layer, which can be deployed at 
data plane layer at OVS for host and network security. SDN privacy and safeguards developed are 
configured by the administrator, as the sole control of the system resides with that person. Many 
of the security solutions including DDOS mitigation strategies are developed and deployed 
through this plane. This thesis proposes a similar approach to develop a security solution using CA 
as a tool to provide flooding isolation and system operation via dynamic memory allocation. The 
operator can provide variable solutions, distinguishing the traffic need of a host, set of hosts or a 
sub network leased to different users and organizations.  
 
The entire network can be viewed as “localized logical security zones” which provides security 
mitigation through every step of the way. Control flow commands, security policies and 
administrative decisions for the OVS are securely transferred through northbound API to the 
controller as shown in figure 3.5. Controller relays the information through a secure channel using 
south bound API to VMs and OVSs deployed in data plane. As highlighted before, the control 
plane acts as a filter for secure communication, making sure only authentic data packets are 
processed in either direction. This localized security adds check points along the network adding 
extra redundancy for authentic traffic communication. In support of the secure communication, 
APIs provide timely information on threats against a particular IP in the pool or a compromised 
OVS. Security deployed at OVS can monitor outbound traffic for an insider threat, which is 
another focus of this research. This provides isolation in an organizational network where multiple 
SDN networks can have independent safeguards for preventing a total system crash. Flow table 
residing in a OVS can log IP addresses of malicious hosts and can inform the administrator to 
apply desired prevention measures. Incoming traffic towards a network is subjected to the same 
checks and procedures ensuring network wide integrity of data and strengthens NAC.      
 
 
As compared to a traditional network, SDN planes offer flexibility in terms of logic 
implementation. For instance, instead of proprietary only security implementations, application 
plane allows integration of multiple programming and security software directly. This flexibility 
makes the operator better capable of providing custom solutions according to user preferences. CA 
proposed in this thesis suggests a security system where the algorithm should adapt to the user’s 
traffic and a flooding attack independently and simultaneously. This grants security analysts or 
administrators to only perform higher level functions which is why IPS, IDS and middle boxes are 
upgrading towards CA as mentioned in [6].  
 
3.6. Chapter Summary 
 
To deploy a scalable and security solution for a network, SDN and CA can be integrated for 
optimization. As discussed in this chapter, many algorithms-based security systems are utilized 
for security which are deployed across SDN. Traditional SDN security deployments at controller 
are fast moving towards OVS as a better and efficient option. SDN offers flexible deployment of 
network security where LOD can be implemented remotely by the administrator without physical 
intervention in contrast to traditional L2 IPS and IDS. The controller coordinates the data plane 
through instructions managed by administrator at the application layer. Communication between 
different planes of SDN is carried out through secure APIs. The next chapter will discuss how 




CHAPTER 4  
 
PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1. Introduction 
 
A Proof of Concept (PoC) for the proposed Software Defined Network – Cognitive Algorithm is 
presented in this chapter. The algorithm is designed for DDOS – ICMP detection and mitigation 
as well as Dynamic Memory Allocation (DMA) in a SDN. Opendaylight (ODL) is used as open 
source project for defining and implementing the CA, application layer and API’s, and ODL 
Controller to manipulate Open vSwitch (OVS). The proposed framework in the previous chapter 
is implemented by integrating OVS, VMs and Opendaylight. DDOS mitigation is achieved by 
implementing a python script algorithm, supported at application layer, which is managed and 
executed by the ODL controller at the OVS switch. This ensures Network Access Control (NAC) 
while providing total control over the SDN. An ideal Matlab simulated solution for non-lossy 
packet environment is also presented which is used for result analysis in next chapter.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 elaborates the software tools utilized for SDN 
deployment and the technologies supporting the set up. ODL platform, OVS and controller 
integration are primary software through which SDN is created, for the proposed method. SDN-
CA security in light of the created set up is discussed to highlight its efficiency as a security service. 
This section is concluded on the API’s used for the data transfer between host and admin at data 
and application plane respectively. The Design and implementation of the network (via tools 
described in 4.2) is demonstrated in section 4.3. A comprehensive network configuration is 
elaborated, where CA for mitigation and DMA is implemented. Lastly, the chapter is concluded 
in the summary.      
 
 
4.2. Associated Software and Technologies 
 
This section gives in depth details of the various software platforms and technologies, integrated 
to provide the SDN based CA solution for security. ODL platform and controller is established to 
provide application and control plane organization which oversees the tasks carried out in 
infrastructure (data plane) layer devices, OVSs and VMs. The VMs hosted by VirtualBox are 




4.2.1. OpenDayLight (ODL) 
 
OpenDaylight (ODL) is a modular open platform for customizing and automating networks of any 
size and scale which arose out of the SDN movement, with a clear focus on network 
programmability [7]. It is a software platform supported by The Linux Foundation, openly 
available to the public for academic and industrial research. Figure 4.1 illustrates some of the 
existing projects under ODL Helium. The following subsections will discuss the various 
components and functionalities of ODL in detail. 
 
Figure 4.1 ODL Helium Projects [7], [33] 
 
4.2.1.1 ODL Controller 
 
The controller is launched as a distinguished software entity which is connected to the ODL. The 
controller uses a Java Virtual Machine to operate and is connected to the OVS and ODL application 
through various APIs. The ODL Controller utilizes Representation State Transfer REST-API for 
its northbound communication towards application layer [7]. This offers a secure state transfer 
from applications layer to the controller to further develop and deploy, infrastructure layer. The 
southbound API by default is configured through OpenFlow (OF) and Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) as stated in section 3.1. Conventional routing and network device configuration with BGP 
makes easier integration for the southbound API. As shown in figure 4.1, Service Abstraction 
Layer (SAL) is connected to these modules to provide Software Platform as a Service (SPaaS) as 




4.2.2. Open vSwitch (OVS) 
 
Open vSwitch (OVS) is a widely used software switch which uses a tuple space search algorithm 
for packet classification, and an exact match cache (EMC) scheme for caching most frequently 
used flows [36]. OVSs are created to bridge the gap between the VM, hypervisor and the ethernet 
connection to the internet, in a SDN and cloud environment where network is ever expanding. The 
hypervisor containing the VMs have finite numbers of Network Identity Cards (NIC) which 
provides limited connectivity for hosts. Due to this, each subnetwork is limited to few connections 
due to limited NIC as shown in figure 3.4. The OVSs bridges that gap by connecting VMs to a 
Virtual Interface (vIF) which is connected to physical interface (pIF) commonly eth0, for 
connection to the rest of the network. Like traditional networking devices containing routing tables 
and protocols, OVS houses flow tables to execute open flow actions by identifying MAC 
addresses, IPs and ports of the source and destination. The flow table manager is configured to 
manage searching, adding, updating and deleting of flow entries in the flow table [2]. Architectural 
design of OVS is shown in figure 4.2. Proprietary L2/L3 switches and routers are introduced within 
the SDN for resource management and compatibility. Resource management simply implicates 
that OVS and associated SDN resources are limited and are combined with proprietary physical 
hardware technology to optimize the network for efficiency and NAC 
 
 
Figure 4.2 OVS Architecture [33] 
 
 
4.2.3. Virtual Box 
 
VirtualBox is an Oracle supported platform designed to be a virtual test-bed for the proposed 
framework. It is designed to enhance academic and industrial research, without the need for actual 
hardware deployment. The suggested SDN-CA solution is implemented on a Linux Operating 
System (OS). Hypervisors, VMs and multi-tenant network are established using Mininet on Virtual 
Box platform, where a localized subnetwork is connected to OVS using southbound BGP and open 
flow APIs.     
Multiple Operating Systems (OS) could be used in Virtual box depending upon compatibility of 
the system. Linux OS is chosen owing to its ease and user familiarization with the system. Report 
in [30] discusses the effects of DOS attack on SDN Controllers in Virtual Box simulation. Similar 
methodology using ODL controller has been employed in this thesis where VMs and hosts are 





The Mininet is a system that allows rapidly prototyping large networks on a single computer and 
it creates scalable SDNs using lightweight virtualization mechanisms, such as processes and 
network namespaces [37]. A small network of 3 hubs and multiple users are deployed as tenants 
for the proposed framework. Users in the subnetwork are connected to OVS by the southbound 
API sflow. IP and MAC for each user is registered as flow entry maintained by flow table in OVS, 
which connects to controller in ODL via REST-API. This ensures user connectivity to SDN and 
the internet which is demonstrated in section 4.3 of the PoC.  
 
 
4.2.4. SDN-CA as a Security Service 
 
The Cognitive Algorithm solution makes scalable security solutions possible by limiting the user 
interference to a minimum. SDN-CA can be used to establish a flexible generic solution, adaptable 
to the DDOS attack, in data plane OVS. The SDN-oriented network is self-managed and self-
controlled where the controller can detect and mitigate attacks automatically [2]. The SDN REST, 
OVSDB, sflow and open flow – API also provides authentication, integrity, and privacy of 
communications between a client and server implementing this protocol [38], which secures SBT 
and NBT. Few of the basic features of CA in SDN are highlighted below: 
 
• Pre-processing Network Traffic Prediction Method: Using Time Range analysis, a 
cumulative average of the traffic can help predict the future traffic patterns [23].  
 
• Network Anomaly: Using (NAPA) [22] and (NADA) [23], we can identify a potential 
DDOS attack and mitigate it before network failure. 
 
• Data Acquisition: Generic and cognitive algorithms operate at the core of data mining and 
cleaning, to obtain required outputs in SDN [6]. SDN-CA security can provide fine 
combing of data to detect malicious packets for malware and IP spoofing. 
 
• Resource Management: Resource allocation, particularly of memory involves algorithm 
deployment. Critical Amount Guaranteed Memory Allocation (CAGMA) presented in 
[21] and secure memory allocation through “Secure Memory Controller (SecMC)” 
demonstrated in [20] both work against catastrophic system failure with algorithm 
solutions. 
   
 
4.2.4.1. Python Script 
 
Python project was started in the early years of 1990 decade by Guido Van Rossum in the CWI in 
Netherlands [40]. It is a multipurpose programming language, with a huge compatibility factor 
with numerous applications. As cited in [40], the language is flexible with diversity towards 
structure, objective oriented and other types of coding requirements. Cognitive Algorithm 
proposed here is written in a python script. The ODL Helium platform supports python script for 
administrative actions related to log management, routing and security allowing easy writing, 
debugging and execution of the script. Python version 2.0 runs in ODL software platform using 





Section 3.3 discussed in detail the importance of APIs for a SDN. A communication between the 
controller and the application plane is established using northbound API and, between controller 
and the data plane using southbound API. APIs used in this PoC are described below: 
 
• REST API: Possibly one of the most important APIs, it is used to establish and maintain 
connection between application and control plane. The controller and software platforms 
run on different address space for which REST provides integration. REST commands 
include GET, PUT, DELETE, POST which are used to request, create/update, remove and 
repeat respectively [40].  
 
• OpenFlow: It provides communication between controller and OVS. The control logic 
from controller is provided to OVS which is stored in its flow table (in form of flow rules). 
Openflow is often extended to support security such as packet data scan detection [2]. This 
thesis suggests the use of flow rules to implement CA.  
 
• OVSDB: This is a data base management protocol that allows configuration of vSwitches 
as a southbound API.  
4.3. Design and Implementation 
 
This section provides a detailed description of how the software platforms and technologies 
discussed in section 4.2 have been used to present PoC in this thesis. The various sections covering 
different topics in this section are Network Setup, CA deployment, Dynamic Memory Allocation 
deployment, DMA and CA integration, OVS flow rule configuration and flow table 
reconfiguration.   
4.3.1. Network Setup 
 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the network deployment of OVS, vSwitches and multiple tenant network 
in the SDN data plane. OVS provides security checks for traffic growth between multiple users, in 
and out of network, and relays the information to the controller for analysis. A small network of 
two vSwitches s1 and s2, hosting multiple tenants ranging from h1 to S3, S4 and S6 respectively, 
are created in Mininet. Software-defined networks using lightweight virtualization mechanisms, 
such as processes and network namespaces, permit the Mininet to create, interact, customize and 
share the prototypes quickly [37]. Both vSwicthes are created under independent VMs in Virtual 
Box so that two vSwitches cannot communicate directly without an OVS as shown in figure 4.3. 
This is to ensure the flow of network traffic in data plane through OVS. Set up for the vSwicthes 
is explained in Appendix A. VirtualBox allows for automatic port mapping within the network 
which is confirmed by establishing connection between two users of the same network. 
Throughout the setup ping command is used to establish network connectivity [42] and as means 
of DDOS attack [12], [8] for testing the network for vulnerabilities.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Data Plane deployment 
 
The Shell – CLI of Debian based OS allows for easy installation and configuration of OVSs in the 
OS as demonstrated in Appendix A. An OVS bridge named “OVS Link” using “ovs-vsctl” 
command [33] is built as shown in figure 4.3. By default, OVS is connected to the IP stack of 
DHCP, which is connected to the pIF of the system (eth0). In order to establish connection to other 
networks (internet), OVS link’s internal port is made a DHCP client, with a valid IP address and 
default gateway as shown in figure 4.4 [33]. Network connection is verified with ping to “google” 
to confirm network traffic flow. The sub network hosting tenants and vSwitches is connected to 
OVS using virtual tap ports.  
 
The OVSDB protocol establishes data flow from OVS to the subnetwork vSwicthes and hosts [36]. 
The OVSDB management protocol is intended to allow programmatic access to the OVS database 
[38]. Port connection from the OVS to the VMs is configured through a bridge network adaptor in 
virtual box which facilitates a valid network setup shown in Appendix A. OVS and VMs 
connections in figure 4.4 are supported by open flow protocols which support SDN  configuration, 
necessary for this thesis. Connections between vSwicthes-vSwicthes and vSwitches-eth0 are tested 
to ensure intra and inter – network wide connectivity respectively. By default, OVS is configured 
to forward packets as a normal layer 2 OSI model switch [33], which enables data flow without 
the use of a SDN controller as demonstrated so far. This practice allows for backward compatibility 
in a traditional network system with an OVS.   
 
 
Figure 4.4 OVS and VM Interface Integration [33] 
 
The ODL controller is used in this thesis for relaying control information to OVS as discussed in 
section 4.2.1.1. The controller is established as a node in the ODL platform where it is assigned 
MAC address and designated port for connection with OVS. MAC, IP and port address allows for 
a SSH connection between the OVS and the Controller. Automatic port mapping using open flow 
allows for default port connection between a remote controller and opensource application 
platform in most generic controllers. However, a manual connection using port, MAC and IP 
information is established in this thesis.The packet flow behavior between OVS and controller is 




Figure 4.5 OVS – ODL reactive flow [12] 
 
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the constant update of controller by a switch as cited in [12]. Using Open 
Flow Packet Transfer (OFPT) data packet is sent to controller where new flow rule is sent and 
replaced at the switch. The effects of a DDOS attack in [12] are assessed by OVSs for which a 
new flow entry using “OFPT_PACKET_IN” is sent by the controller. The same methodology is 
used in this thesis where CA is deployed using python in application layer. Algorithm is converted 
to flow entries which are forwarded to controller for deployment using REST-API. The ODL 
Helium allows default data packet forwarding to the ODL controller using REST API. 
 
4.3.2. Cognitive Algorithm Deployment 
 
The Cognitive algorithm is deployed as a python script which allows for troubleshooting and 
compatibility in the ODL environment. A similar approach in [27] is used where an algorithm is 
used for an event-based security system in data plane. The Ryu controller used in that work 
supports python scripts for security implementation. CA is developed in application plane by the 
operator, and is transferred to the ODL controller for processing via REST API. The proposed 
model here is to deploy security measures at the OVS to alleviate controller from managing large 
traffic. Experiments performed in [2], [26] and [27] are based on algorithm-based security which 
is deployed at OVS or data plane layer. The algorithm is deployed through a secure API at OVS. 
The flow table manager is configured to manage searching, adding, updating, and deleting of flow 
entries in table and OVSDB confirms that new security policies are correctly inserted [2]. The 
security measures are stored as flow rules which are used as LOD against DDOS attacks for 
detection and mitigation. The security solution deployed at the data plane also generates less traffic 
due to little required communication. Variables involved for detection, mitigation and tracing such 
as source IP, MAC address all reside in flow tables. Each ICMP request source information is 
stored before stripping the headers as it moves for forwarding, which is overseen by OVSDB in 
real time. Data packets from north and south bound traffic are incremented for ICMP flooding. 
This prevents a potential DDOS attack from within the network as discussed in section 3.2. 
4.3.3. DDOS Mitigation and DMA – CA 
 
The ODL – cognitive algorithm framework, for ICMP DDOS mitigation as well as DMA is 
presented below. The ODL application layer structures the CA and then transfers it to ODL 
controller. The algorithm is built on Markov’s Chain Rule [34] as discussed in section 3.2.1. The 
ODL controller assigns CA for the required OVS subnetwork. The user specific solution is 
provided by the controller to cater for varying organizational or individual traffic requirements 
respectively. NAPA and NADA cited in [22] and [23] respectively, are based on computational 
algorithm where probabilistic traffic analysis helps determine if the network is under attack or not. 
CA in this thesis is based on dynamic count check to analyze a potential increasing ICMP traffic 
disguised as a DDOS attack. The IP and MAC identity of the source is processed against growing 
traffic to isolate the attacker and enforce mitigation policy flow rule. Following a potential red 
flag: 
 
• Malicious source is isolated.  
• Additional memory is allotted to the OVS. 
• Data dump for malicious source is performed in flow tables. 
• And new flow rules are requested by OVS flow tables through ODL Controller.  
 
Controller manages memory allocation and instructions using OVSB and OVSDB which relays 
information to VMs using virtual ports. CA allows for constant check and balance for an overflow 
while updating its flow table for new policies simultaneously, in real time.    
 
ODL Cognitive Algorithm for DDOS Mitigation & DMA 
 
Task:    Store ICMP requests against Source_IP in OVS flow table;  
             Perform count check for ICMP increment; Consult flow table for new policies. 
 
Action: Locate appropriate policy for scenario; Install security policy; Update flow table or  
             request controller for new mitigation policies. 
 
1. For all ICMP_Requests do;     
2.       Perform count check against source IP                  %Metering Algorithm per IP% 
3. Time = time++; Countcheck = 0; Increment = contt       %Count check measure % 
4. If Time ≥ contt3 
5.      If Countcheck ≥ initial value then;                              %Condition verification% 
6.              action ← perform concerned mitigation. 
7.      Where action → Block IP_Source; 
8.                                  Initiate Source_IP trace; 
9.                                  Initiate Source_IP memory dump;   
10.      Else; 
11.         Forward packet to ODL Controller for policy update;    %New security policy% 
12.   End If;    
13.       Memory = Memory + Increment; 
14.       Countcheck = Countcheck + Increment1; 
15.       Add new flow rule 
16. End for;      
4.4. Chapter Summary 
 
To validate the SDN-CA security proposed ideas of chapter 3 are executed in PoC. Software and 
technologies required for the emulation of the proposed model are discussed. ODL and ODL 
Controller in helium-based architecture of platform offers integration with python and plug ins, 
with ease and reliability. Mininet and Virtual Box are integrated for Linux based system to 
establish VM and hosts in data plane layer. Integration of these two technologies offer scalable 
and rapid deployment of sub network in this SDN platform. Installation and deployment of OVS 
is carried through Linux Shell and is connected to internet and VMs through pIF and vIF 
respectively. OVS is linked to controller using OVSDB and OVSB to establish secure connection. 
ODL and ODL controller are linked through REST API. This chapter further introduces CA used 
for security and DMA which is presented as a scalable modern solution for DDOS prevention and 






































This chapter discusses the outcomes and result comparison analysis of the experimental set up 
explained in previous chapter. The outcomes for the projected model with and without 
enforcement of CA are compared. Network analysis of CA in the given state of the device is 
explained in detail. This chapter focuses on the architectural networks deployment of the system 
and its configuration with SDN Controller; DDOS attacks are performed for output comparison; 
and Network Access Denial also serves as a test to conduct CA simulation. Further it broadly 
specifies the mathematical model (formula and code) implementation of the CA.  
The employed algorithm output is to be evaluated against count variables (ICMP). Finally, the 
graphical output for packet drop percentage and filtration is studied to conclude the thesis. The 
key factor associated with network filtration is RTT to isolate the source. A Wireshark supported 
packet trace, for advance countermeasures is suggested as well.      
 
5.2. Attack Initialization 
 
In this section we will discuss the types of DDOS attacks used, their impact on SDN without CA 
deployment and resource utilization. As elaborated in section 3.2, CA is designed to monitor traffic 
flowing in and out of OVS. Security systems, by default, are configured for monitoring traffic 
flowing into the network. The attack is deployed by the host within the network towards the victim 
to test the algorithm. The feedback from OVS to the ODL Controller in the control plane verifies 
the validity of the detection and countermeasures. ODL Controller relays the information to 
application layer which provides new security flow rules, implemented by the controller. 
 
5.2.1. Types of DDOS Attacks 
 
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in OpenFlow SDN networks involves overwhelming computing 
or networking resources such that an OVS is unable to forward packets as expected [12]. As 
mentioned in literature review, classification and type of DOS attack varies ranging from TCP, 
Smurf, ICMP and many others depending upon intent and priority of the attacker. An ICMP flood 
attack is used in this thesis to attack a host within a network. The traffic is generated from user s1, 
s2 and s3 residing under switch 1 directed towards user (victim) in switch 2, as shown in figure 
5.1. The traffic is routed through OVS to have a centralized network data flow point in the entire 
data plane. Centralized data flow for each subnetwork allows for filtration through CA. Attack 




Figure 5.1 Network Topology of ODL SDN 
 
5.2.2. Attack Simulation 
 
Hping3 is a packet generator and analyzer for the TCP/IP protocol. This tool can be used for 
security auditing, testing of firewalls and networks [30]. Hping3 offers multiple attack techniques 
as shown in [30]. For simplification, known IP of S5 is flooded with attack packets to simulate a 
DOS attack. The packets are flooded at a rate of 60,000 packets/sec as a single attack source. The 
attack path and the sub network data traffic – flow is shown in figure 4.3. Hping3 is a software 
platform that utilizes the same principle as ping of death attack. The Ping of Death is a typical 
TCP/IP implementation attack. In this assault, the DDOS attacker creates an IP packet that exceeds 
the IP standard's maximum 65,536-byte size [5]. When the system cannot assemble the large 
packet quickly enough, it either crashes or reboots. S3 uses static IP to send ICMP flood attack 
packets towards S5 at a slow rate of 40,000 packets/sec. 
 
  
Figure 5.2 Hping3 Throughput Figure 5.3 Ping of Death Throughput 
 
 
Figure 5.4 LOIC Throughput 
 
Slow DOS attacks induce delays in the network and memory consumption due to response. This 
type of attack is usually combined with high bandwidth attacks such as Hping3 and LOIC to 
amplify the strength of a DDOS. Some of these newer DDoS tools, such as Low Orbit Ion Cannon 
(LOIC), were originally developed as network stress testing tools but were later modified and used 
for malicious purposes [45]. This is a GUI software platform that allows for high volume data 
packet to be sent per second. An attack rate of 80,000 packets per second is initiated using LOIC 
as shown in figure 5.4. The software allows for target IP to be flooded by a desired number of 
packets per second as shown in figure 5.5 [45]. DOS attack for each type is shown in figures 5.2, 
5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 LOIC Interface [46] 
5.2.3. Simulation Analysis 
 
DDOS attack strength is a measure of memory exhaustion, network intrusion and packet or 
information loss from that network. ICMP in an SDN network is particularly designed for packet 
loss, and memory exhaustion which is the measure of DDOS attack strength for this research. 
Table 5.1 shows the packet loss, power consumption and memory utilization for individual attacks 
as well as DDOS. 
 
Type of Attack CPU Utility Memory Unit Duration of 
Attack 
Packet Loss Rate 
of Victim 
Hping3 67% 63% 45 sec 74.48% 
Ping of Death 55% 45% 60+ sec 18.5% 
LOIC 89% 82% 35 sec 92% 
Collective / 
DDOS 
96% 86.63% ------ 93.35% 
 
Table 5.1 Resource Utilization During DDOS 
 
Maximum packet loss is observed across DDOS attack where 93.35% of the packets were dropped. 
As the attack strength of DDOS varies, so does the CA response time to it. CA is designed to detect 
and isolate data traffic after certain data limit is reached. This defines the duration of attack as 
large data packets with higher bandwidth would reach limit quicker contrary to low bandwidth, 
small data packets. The SDN, without CA is subjected to heavy packet loss and high memory 
consumption. Graphical output for combined DDOS attacks is shown in figure 5.6 
 
 
Figure 5.6 DDOS Attack Throughput 
 
5.3. Network Reconfiguration 
 
This section covers the SDN changes implemented in the network after CA deployment. Security 
management functions are developed and updated by application layer. The cognitive algorithm 
developed in section 4.3.3 is programmed in application layer. Application layer allows for the 
algorithm to be defined by one of the two ways: 
 
• Dev API 
• REST API 
 
Dev API lets direct design of the algorithm or routing configuration through flow rules. It is 
primarily used by developers to directly install new flow rules into the controller through live 
application platform. REST API is used in this thesis which allows for development, deployment 
and update configuration of the CA. Protocols like “Simple Network Management Protocol” 
(SNMP) [38] developed through open standards, deliver routing and security policies. SNMP and 
Northbound APIs deliver the updated security measures to the control plane where they are 
implemented. Another protocol incorporated for managing and delivering security solution is 
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF). NETCONF is an IETF network management 
protocol that provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network 
devices [38]. Numerous other such open source protocols exist, configured to the requirement of 
the developer software platform. This provides easy automation of the system on the go and 
reduces administrative workload. 
The SDN-CA is developed using python 2.0 application in application/management layer. Figure 
5.7 given below when supported by table in section 4.3.3, provides an elaborated flowchart of the 
network configuration. 
 
Figure 5.7 Network Reconfiguration 
 
When received, OVS decapsulates the packet for ICMP header and adds it in an incrementing 
count check. Each OpenFlow-compliant switch maintains one or more flow tables, which are used 
to perform packet lookups [38]. The count check is performed by a “Metering Algorithm” which 
keeps track of ICMP entry against different IP’s. Indicated attack source IP for thesis simulation 
are 192.168.42.104, 192.168.42.233 and 192.168.42.77 shown in Appendix. Flow rule determines 
the maximum number of allowed ICMP requests per user based on the algorithm. The Little’s Law 
determines the memory allocation of the SDN, based on the resources available. Memory 
allocation is described in detail in the next section. In case of a potential DDOS attack, OVS uses 
Southbound API to inform ODL Controller. This is to ensure network wide security through 
constant update of control plane. Isolated IP or MAC source is blacklisted and a flow rule update, 
is sent to every OVS in the network. Prevention of simultaneous attacks on multiple OVS of the 
network is paramount, for which control plane has to constantly update the infrastructure layer. 
ODL Controller uses control logic to request new flow rules by the application layer. The 
application layer provides a security solution based on the existing CA scheme or, prompts the 
administrator to develop an updated version. 
During the setup of the lab for simulation of this experiment, no major compatibility issues were 
faced. Minor issue like NETCON, Data ping transmission and protocol implementations were 
presented but were resolved. Having said that, a different scenario may present its own unique 
challenges for compatibility, which leaves room for future experimentation.   
 
5.3.1. Maximum Memory Enforcement 
 
5.3.1.1. Little’s Law 
 
Little’s Law reasons average waiting time and number of items and relates these two metrics via 
the average rate of arrivals to the system [43]. This law is often employed to calculate throughput 
of a network, with many more applications for time and count dependent variables. Depending on 
the variables involved, a maximum threshold could be determined for a system. Most common use 
of this law in networks is for determining the window size for incoming traffic. Mathematically it 













= 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇.       (9) 
𝐴 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐿(𝑇) =  𝜆(𝑇)𝑊(𝑇)                                                     (10)   
 
Little’s Law Mathematical Analysis [43]  
 
The maximum memory allocation for this thesis considers constant number of hosts, with potential 
for scalability. Little’s Law allows for scalable solution for a dynamic system. 
 
Number of Users = x 
ICMP Requests = y(t)/sec 
Maximum memory available = m  
Maximum memory threshold = Sys = m – (m/100)*15 
User Threshold =  U = [Sys * (1/y(t)*x)] * percentage 
 
The above equation shows the memory allocation for each individual user in relationship to the 
ICMP requests being processed. The system has a memory allocation denoted by “m” at any given 
instance t. However, this does not represent the maximum memory, which can be expanded to 
“Sys” under large amount of ICMP requests. “Sys” represents the maximum memory resource 
available for a System (Hypervisor), with the exception of 15%, which is only made available as 
a redundancy. Finally, each individual user is allocated a memory threshold out of “Sys” for ICMP 
management which is denoted by “U”. The vital notation “U” is the primary focus, as it represents 
user memory and is utilized as a cut off parameter for ICMP DDOS mitigation.  ‘x’ determines the 
memory distribution, for given ICMP requests. This allows for flexible system where additional 
memory and users are automatically accommodated. HP 5406zl mentioned in [12] is used for small 
network deployment with little memory requirements for the system. This reduces the chance for 
a catastrophic system failure under a large DDOS attack. 
5.4. Analysis of Results 
 
The proposed CA solution reduces the chances of DDOS attack overwhelming an SDN where 
multiple tenants could be potential targets. The simulations demonstrate effectiveness of CA and 
DMA in an SDN, where in presence of no security measure network could be brought down easily. 
Figure 5.9 shows the response of the system under DDOS with security measures. The bandwidth 
of the system is quickly overwhelmed by the attacker and legitimate packets are dropped as a 
result. The defense against a malicious source shows promising results after the deployment of 
SDN-CA. The ICMP packet strength is measured per second against source which provides real 
time update of the flow table. Figure 5.9 shows the results of the CA when deployed against DDOS.  
Table 5.2 represents the packet filtration percentage for the amount of packets generated in figure 







Packet filtration 𝑃𝑓 is calculated using, “𝐶𝑝” calculated packet response and 𝐴𝑝which is actual 
packet response of the system.  
Type of Attack Calculated Filtration 
Packet vs Time 
Actual Filtration 
Packets vs Time 
Packet Filtration 
Range (%) 
LOIC 2.5 Million Packets / 
32 sec 
3.05 Million packets / 
37 sec 
62.22 – 70.21% 
Ping of Death 2.6 Million Packets / 
65 sec 
2.69 Million Packets / 
66 sec 
65.87 – 73.38% 
Hping3 2.7 Million Packets / 
45 sec 
2.88 Million Packets / 
48 sec 
78.51 – 85.97% 
Table 5.2 Packet Response of the System 
 
Immediately it shows 60-75% packet restriction and IP source isolation by blocking any further 
traffic. Despite increasing strength of the attacks, memory allocation prevents from network wide 
failure, which is confirmation of the proposed algorithm. It can therefore be concluded that as the 
attack is being isolated, memory response for the system increases and ICMP traffic is filtered and 
restricted. As the response is instantaneous for the number of packets generated, no need for 
mitigation response calculation was necessary as no catastrophic CPU or memory loss occurred.  
 
Wireshark was used to monitor and track the amount of data flowing through the network as well 
as tracking legitimate packet drop/send. This part can be covered in threefold. 
• The I/O graph enables to measure data packet bandwidth against time which was used 
before and after CA implementation. 
• The data packets in Wireshark based on their source and destination IP can be monitored. 
Wireshark in this simulation had administrative viewing privileges, so that it can monitor 
all the traffic generated. This allowed confirmation for dropped and received packets 
during an attack as shown in Appendix A8. 
• Finally, Wireshark is useful when it comes to calculating RTT of the data packet. 
At any given instant the memory allocated and buffer for data handling is fixed for an OVS. So 
avertedly the measure of handling a DDOS attack falls on SDN Controller and how fast it responds 
and how quickly it allocates memory. So, the major contributing factors under consideration were 
SDN Controller CPU consumption and DMA consumption at OVS. Both are mathematically 
calculated and presented in table 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.9 CA Deployment Results against DDOS  
 
Figure 5.9 and table 5.2 confirm that high volume attacks with larger bandwidths have a slower 
reactive response to them. Confirmation of sudden attack takes time and delay in security measure 
response. Also, it shows the bandwidth and ICMP packets per second decrease after the 
enforcement of the security measures. A similar attack performed on a different OVS would act as 
a confirmation of isolation of attacker in entire SDN. Attack deterrence also alleviates memory 
and power resources of the system as indicated in table 5.1. For further network deterrence and 
evasive measures, more complex algorithm can be developed for the system. However, this would 
have to be accompanied by larger SDN resources, more efficient network solutions and advance 
programmability on the developer’s part. The results further pave way for the following solutions. 
 
5.4.1. Round Trip Time and Packet Trace 
 
After successful isolation of an IP source, productive offensive measures against the attackers 
could be taken. Cybercrime like any other dictates mitigation at first and then tracking and locating 
the party involved. The use of Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) has proven to be an effective method 
for packet trace as mentioned in [44]. The eBPF program traces network packets and extracts data 
from the header of the traced packet data at kernel space and passes extracted data to the “BPF 
Compilation Collection (BCC)” program again [44]. IP source is already available as the packets 
associated with ICMP requests require so. However, compromised sources and bot attacks allow 
hackers to work from the shadows, while leaving little or no traces. In most cases if not the hacker, 
compromised source/bot could be located and informed of the system breach. 
 
Routing path in support of packet trace can also be aided by round trip time (RTT) calculation. 
This provides the geographical overview of the network being utilized and the associated core 
routers. Security organizations can share the information to prevent intra network breaches. RTT 
is used to verify the availability of network to send/receive data packets. At any given instance 
RTT delay directly correlates to the available network bandwidth. RTT is a tool used to measure 
the strength of the DDOS attack. Increasing strength of attack would result in longer time delay 
for packet transfer in either direction and longer round-trip time. The concept of packet tracing is 
used to validate the malicious host isolation as a way of mitigation. It is back-up policy for multiple 
DOS attacks incase simple blacklisting and filtration is not sufficient, and an offensive security 
response is needed.  
 
 
5.5. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented the simulation and experiment analysis that was discussed in the PoC for 
SDN-CA security solution. The CA was evaluated for response measure and isolation for security 
against multiple DOS attack sources. Evaluation analysis was made on the bases of ICMP flooding 
response in comparison to the expected calculated response. The test results show that higher 
bandwidth attacks pose a graver threat in an SDN where response measure is taken into 
consideration. CA deployment and security update of ODL controller allows logical isolation of 
the attack source. It prevents system wide failure or resource depletion and DMA ensures system 
wide function even during attack. It also elaborates high bandwidth likes LOIC and Hping3, which 
demand more rapid response and cause overhead delays if not dealt with quickly enough. The 
network is reconfigured and the isolation and mitigation against the attack are calculated as well. 
It shows that the CA deters 60-75% of the attack immediately, with high effectiveness and 
accuracy. Lastly it presented isolation and tracking parameters for counter, using flow table black 






















In this chapter we are going to discuss the overall findings of the thesis – research and potential 
areas for its growth and development. In addition to findings, this chapter also discusses the future 




Cognitive Algorithm has tremendous scope and application in network management solutions and 
security development. CA especially benefits SDN as both represent the flexible and dynamic 
network deployment and control. Cybercriminals and cyber-attack techniques are evolving every 
day and they require more advance countermeasures to deal with. Cloud network providers often 
provide a complete network infrastructure solution which can be used to deploy different other 
solutions. SDN offers network as a solution (NaaS) and CA supports NaaS to provide a software 
as a solution (SaaS). The resulting network offers programmability, dynamic control and robust 
network.  
 
Software Defined Network despite its many advantages provides a number of challenges, 
particularly in security sector. The dynamic nature and multiple plane configuration presents new 
and improvised security challenges towards existing networks. This thesis has prioritized and 
discussed security measures deployed against DDOS attacks. DDOS attacks are the most common 
and widely popular type of attack amongst hackers. Work in thesis illustrates how merging two 
technologies (DMA and Security Algorithm) under a single umbrella (CA) offers NAC, network 
reconfiguration, DDOS mitigation and attack isolation.  
 
The DMA is modified by Cognitive algorithm and is at the disposal of user for alteration. This is 
achieved by providing software solution in application plane of SDN. The script is written in 
python to provide a HLPO solution for the memory resource management. This ensures proper 
memory allocation to the network and prevents depletion during a DDOS attack. Furthermore, CA 
is not limited to security and resource management. Enhanced HLPO with developing solutions 
through AI offer effective and dynamic network routing configurations. Such configurations have 
been addressed as future for many mitigation techniques, which will be discussed in the next 
section. This thesis discusses existing DMA and algorithm-based security solutions for SDN and 
DDOS mitigation. The solutions are assessed for their weaknesses and strengths to cultivate a new 
improved security response. The network security techniques presented in past are reviewed and 
carefully analyzed. After examining the security systems, their dependencies and proposed past 




Within the confines of SDN architecture consisting of Application, Control and Data plane; a new 
mitigation technique using CA solution is proposed. Security solution using application plane 
software extension (Python 2.0) is proposed and developed at application layer of ODL. This is 
presented as a PoC where security script is developed by the user to be transferred to the Control 
plane using APIs. ODL controller maintains the flow rules updates and security implementation 
controls to the OVS. For every new threat against a DDOS attack, an alternate security rule is 
updated by the controller. Attack source isolation is directed by controller to the OVSs for NAC 
and ICMP flooding prevention. OVS flow rules for flooding prevention ensure the default isolation 
of outgoing flood attacks as well. This ensures security measures against compromised sources 
within the network. The constant feedback form the OVS maintains a valid network traffic flow 
management. The work done here is derived from research conducted in past which showed 
promising results towards the deployment of CA at OVS (data plane layer), which is overseen by 
Control plane for evaluation and action execution.   
 
The proposed tools in PoC were used to set up the experiment, and the CA security solution. A 
DDOS attack was performed on the SDN without security measures to analyze the system network 
traffic. An attack scenario helped in understanding the effects of DDOS on resources such as CPU 
utilization, memory usage and packet loss of the user. This also formed bases for comparison with 
an SDN with security CA deployed. The CA showed that high bandwidth attacks require rapid 
response for traffic block and isolation from the source. ICMP flood with increasing bandwidth 
and sudden data injection demands quick reaction which otherwise compromises network 
resources. CA deployment resulted in isolation and data loss recovery of 65-70% of the traffic. 
The DMA showed the optimization of the system under LOIC attack, which prevented a system 
failure due to memory resource depletion. All these solutions and attack analysis are overseen by 
the administrator in real time, which allows him to take timely and informed decisions. All the 
attack attempts are recorded, and cooperating ISPs can be informed for isolation of compromised 
tenant IP source.  
 
The security policy had to be enforced through a High-Level Programmable Output (HLPO) at 
application plane of SDN. The HLPO is written in Python in Helium SDN open platform. Helium 
and other Open source platform support Python extension for scripting and allow customization 
of code. Python is used in this thesis to develop a dynamic security algorithm to self-adjust itself 
based on input acquired from devices. The concept has been highlighted by many authors before 
which are mentioned in this thesis. This thesis has simply combined those two ideas and provided 
with a DDOS mitigation strategy. The idea of combining the two concepts is fairly new and can 
offer a lot of applications in future cloud and SDN solutions.  
 
6.3. Future Solutions 
CA and more advanced AI based solutions represent the future of SDN security. The solutions can 
be integrated with variety of security techniques to offer wide spectrum of attack mitigation. 
Proposed solution in this thesis can be integrated with Honeypot solution which offers a dummy 
target source for the attacker to target. This will provide security through obscurity as the identity 
of real source will be isolated. This is the ironic solution to the attack as bot systems allow hackers 
to conceal their true identity as well and makes it difficult to track them.  
 
Dynamic nature of SDN could also be used in IP and resource allocation. CA provides a flexible 
and easy to deploy network solution. This solution can be further strengthened with “Moving 
Target Defense (MTD)” which offers more security to the SDN. MTD offers dynamic and random 
IP source allocation which makes the attacker’s job of victim isolation very difficult. Algorithms 
are designed to be configurable and easily compatible, which makes their integration to existing 
and new solutions like MTD and honeypot very easy.  
6.4. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has given the overview of the proposed and existing solutions. It revisited the PoC 
and the implemented results through CA and DMA for DDOS mitigation. Obtained results were 
shown to be effective and, future advance solution possibilities in relation to the research are 
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Appendix A: Experiment 
 
 
A1. Set up & Configuration 
 
This section describes how the tools and software mentioned in PoC are actually used to implement 
and deploy SDN – CA. This is to present an insight to the reader through the various installation 
and configuration procedures.  
 
A2. System Requirement 
 
The ODL platform, virtual box and supporting software were implemented on a system with 
following specs: Core i5, 500 Gb hard disk, 16 Gb RAM with Linux Mint 18.3 Operating System. 
Mininet and Wireshark were configured as a part of virtual box platform and OVS switch was 
deployed using LINUX – CLI shell. 
 
A3. Open Virtual Switch Installation and Set up 
 
OVS 2.9.90 was installed using Open source platform through CLI shell of Linux. It was installed 
using the following command: 
 
sudo apt-get install openvswitch-switch 
 
The switch was given a port connection and assigned a DHCP IP so that all the traffic is routed 




1. ovs-vsctl add-br mylink  
2. ifconfig mylink up 
3. ovs-vsctl add-port mylink enlpo2 
4. ifconfig enlpo2 
5. dhclient mylink  
6. ip tuntap add mode tap vport1     %for each port% 
7. ifconfig vport1 up 
8. ovs-vsctl add-port mylink vport1    %for each port%      
  
 
These commands initialize and establish an OVS switch with four tuntap ports which can be later 
connected to the Virtual box. The bridge is remote access and automatically configured in tree 









Figure 7.2 OVS Virtual Tun Tap Ports and IPs 
 
A4. Virtual Box Set Up 
 
Linux platform support both Virtual box and VM Ware. For this experiment, Oracle Virtual Box 
5.1 was used which is shown in figure below. Three independent Virtual Machines are initiated 
using bridged adapter, which are connected to tuntap ports of OVS. The fourth one is kept idle in 
case needed for monitoring or other such purposes. The network is configured in VM so that 
subnetworks or switches withinthe VM cannot send traffic directly to each other. This is to ensure 




Figure 7.3 Virtual Box Set Up 
 
 
A5. Mininet Network Set up 
 
A Mininet OVF image file was downloaded using mininet.org. The file acted as the OS for Vitual 
Box platform for the network topology to be deployed. Network topology was deployed using the 
following commands: 
 
sudo mn --switch ovs --controller remote --topo tree,depth=2,fanout=2 
sudo mn –-switch ovs --controller port 192.168.49.322:6634   
 
The network set up is shown below in the following figures. These figures represent the attack 










Figure 7.5 Mininet (Xterm) Malicious Source Configurations 2 
 







Opendaylight is installed using the same way as OVS through CLI shell. On Linux OS, Java and 
other dependencies needed to be installed first.  
 
# sudo apt-get install openjdk-7-jdk 
# sudo add-apt-repository ppa:webupd8team/java -y 
# sudo apt-get update 
# sudo apt-get install oracle-java8-installer 
# sudo mkdir -p /usr/local/apache-maven 
 
# sudo service openvswitch-controller stop 
# sudo service openvswitch-switch stop 
# cd distributions/karaf/target/assembly/bin 
# ./karaf -of13 
  
Java, mininet and other such dependencies are necessary for the working of ODL controller. 
After the installation, ODL controller is set up and remote IP is assigned to it established by 
mininet in the Virtual Machine. Also, OVS port and IP are configured using APIs to direct traffic 




Figure 7.7 Opendaylight Network Topology 
 
 
A7. Python 2.0 
 
A python 2.0 extension in ODL is used for the development and deployment of the algorithm. 
The algorithm is configured in python script syntax which is converted into flow rules by ODL 
application platform REST API. Then, it is transferred to ODL Controller where it is managed 




Wireshark is used in this thesis to monitor ICMP packet activity and to measure RTT of the 
packets. It is also used to measure the response of CA against DDOS attacks. Origin and 
destination of the packets are captured in Wireshark which are shown below in the figure:      
 
Figure 7.8 Wireshark Results and RTT for ICMP packet 
